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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

23 February 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-32: THE COMMUNIST MILI-TARY POSITION IN KOREA AND ITS EFFECT ON SINO-SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION IN THE FAR EAST (Draft No. 3, Approved by National Estimates Board)

THE PROBLEM

To assess the Communist military position in Korea and to estimate the effects it may have on Sino-Soviet courses of action in the Far East.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- I. WHAT IS THE PRESENT NORTH KCREAN-CHINESE COMMUNIST MILI-TARY POSITION IN KCREA?
 - A. What is the strength of Chinese Communist and North Korean forces now engaged in the Korean operation?
 - B. What have been their estimated losses to date in men and equipment in terms of

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- 1. Battle casualties?
- 2. Other causes?
- C. What is their present reserve strength in terms of
 - 1. Trained manpower in North Korea?
 - 2. Trained manpower in Manchuria and elsewhere in China?
 - 3. Arms, equipment, and logistic support?
- D. What are the chief limitations on the use of this reserve?

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- E. What has been and is the nature and extent of Soviet material support to
 - 1. The North Koreans?
 - 2. The Chinese?
- F. What are present Communist capabilities for
 - 1. Conducting military operations designed to drive the UN from Korea?
 - 2. Fighting a war of attrition?

II. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE KOREAN CALPAIGN AFFECTED COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST?

A. Have Chinese and Korean losses to date been such that they

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1.	May	have	force	l a	curtail	.ment	of	operat	ions	planned
	for	the	Korean	Cal	mpaign?					
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2. May have hampered Chinese Communist capabilities for coping with internal forces hostile to Peiping?

3. May have curtailed cancelled or deferred operations possibly planned against Taiwan, Tibet, Indochina, Burma, or Japan?

4. May have strained or disrupted the domestic economy of China?

5. May have constituted a significant drain on Soviet resources and logistic facilities?

B. Would continued Chinese-Korean operations in Korea on the present scale be likely to

1. Affect the Chinese Communist problem of coping with hostile internal forces?

2. Curtail, defer, or cancel operations possibly planned against Taiwan, Tibet, Indochina, Burma, or Japan?

3. Strain or disrupt the domestic economy of China?

4. Cause a significant drain on Soviet resources?

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DEFENSE (G-2)

III. WHAT HAS BEEN THE EFFECT OF THE KOREAN CAMPAIGN ON COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE FAR EAST?

- A. Are there reasons to suppose that the Communists have modified their announced intention to drive UN forces from Korea?
- B. If the Communists concluded that under existing conditions they would be unable to drive the UN from Korea, would they
 - 1. Withdraw the Chinese "volunteers", and if so how and to what points?
 - 2. Prolong the Korean fighting as long as possible in an effort to drain US resources, and create further dissension among the UN allies?
 - 3. Seek a negotiated settlement?
 - 4. Call on the USSR to invest further additional aid?
 - 5. Launch major military operations elsewhere?
- C. If the Communists became convinced that the Chinese position in Korea was becoming untenable, would they
 - 1. Withdraw and if so how and to what points?
 - 2. Seek a negotiated settlement?

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- 3. Call on the USSR to intervene?
- 4. Launch major military operations elsewhere?
- D. Have there been any recent signs that the Chinese Communists may now be willing to negotiate?

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- E. What appear to be present Soviet intentions with respect to Korea?
 - 1. Would the USSR be likely to intervene openly if
 - a. It became clear that the Chinese Communists could not expel the UN from Korea?
 - b. A long stalemate ap eared probable?
 - c. A Communist expulsion from Korea were likely?
 - 2. How have military developments in Korea affected and how are they likely to affect Sino-Soviet relations?